Duquesne Law Review
Volume 37

Number 3

Article 3

1999

Building New Stadiums with Your Money Whether You Like It or
Not: The Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Prohibit the Use of
Public Funds to Construct New Stadiums
Michael J. Cremonese

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael J. Cremonese, Building New Stadiums with Your Money Whether You Like It or Not: The
Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Prohibit the Use of Public Funds to Construct New Stadiums, 37 Duq.
L. Rev. 423 (1999).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol37/iss3/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Comments

Building New Stadiums with Your Money Whether
You Like It or Not: The Pennsylvania Constitution
Does Not Prohibit the Use of Public Funds to
Construct New Stadiums
The Pittsburgh Pirates baseball team and the Pittsburgh Steelers
football team have called upon Allegheny County and the City of
Pittsburgh to build, with public money, new stadiums for baseball
and football. The local governments, fearing economic disaster for
the region if either or both franchises would leave, have answered
the call.'
The city and county received assistance from the commonwealth
in the form of the Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Renaissance
Initiative ("RRI"), which was passed by the state legislature.2 The
RRI included an increase in the amount of sales tax by one-half of
one percent for counties in Southwestern Pennsylvania. 3 The RRI
was submitted to a voter referendum in November, 1997;4 the
1. PrrrSBURGH PoSr-GAzETrE, July 10, 1998, at Al. On July 1, 1998, the City of Pittsburgh
and County of Allegheny Regional Destination Financing Plan Proposal was submitted to the
Allegheny Regional Asset District. Id. The proposal was approved by the Allegheny Regional
Asset District on July 9, 1998. Id. Tom Barnes & Robert Dvorchak, Plan B Approved Play
Ba/.
'2. See 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3000 (Supp. 1998).
3. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3000.3054 (Supp. 1998).
4. The Ballot Referendum read as follows:
Do you favor supporting job creation projects in this county by temporarily increasing
the sales tax by 0.5% for seven years, with 75% of the revenues used to fund not more
thanl/2 the cost of expanding the Lawrence Convention Center, and constructing
facilities in the cultural district, a baseball park and a football stadium; and with the
remaining 25% of the revenues used for other economic development projects in
Allegheny County?
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voters rejected it.
Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh, and the Public
Auditorium Authority of the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny
County ("PAX) then devised the Regional Destination Financing
Plan.5 This new plan was designed to provide funds for the two
new stadiums, expansion of the David L. Lawrence Convention
Center, demolition of the existing Three Rivers Stadium, and
construction of a Pittsburgh Destination Center.6 The plan proposes
that $809 million in funds be obtained from public and private
sources.
The public funds are targeted for the construction of the two
new stadiums as well as the other capital improvements
contemplated in the new plan.7 The use of public money will likely
result in legal challenges to invalidate several of the proposed
sources of funds. The intent of this comment is to explore legal
claims that may arise in Pennsylvania from the use of public money
to construct sports stadiums in Pittsburgh in light of recent legal
challenges on the same issue in other states.
Neither nationally nor locally is the use of public funds to
construct stadiums a new concept. In 1930, the Court of Appeals of
Ohio addressed the issue of whether public funds could be used to
erect and maintain a stadium in Cleveland, Ohio.8 The Ohio court
ruled that public funds could be used to construct a stadium. 9
This issue arose when the city of Cleveland determined that it
was necessary to build a "fireproof stadium on the lakefront." 10 The
citizens of Cleveland voted in favor of issuing $2.5 million in bonds
for the construction of the stadium." Accordingly, the city issued
bonds and arranged to build the stadium. 2 Less than one month
after a construction contract was awarded, a taxpayer sought to
13
enjoin the project.
In deciding the issue, the court explained that construction of a
16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3000.3054(b) (Supp. 1998).
5. See infra note 1.
6. City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny, Regional Destination Financing Plan
1-2 (July 1, 1998) (on file with author).
7. See City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny, Regional Destination Financing
Plan (July 1, 1998) (on file with author).
8. Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 2d 606 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
9. Meyer, 171 N.E.2d at 608.
10. Id. at 606.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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sports stadium did indeed constitute a proper public purpose. 14 The
court noted that both the Greek and Roman empires constructed
and maintained stadiums. 15 Furthermore, the court identified
several cities in the United States that had built municipal stadiums
16
without facing legal challenges.
The court identified numerous events that could take place in a
public stadium. 17 Then, the court found that "[ilt is obvious these
purposes promote the public welfare and afford recreation,
entertainment and education to the public."'8 The court concluded
that the proposed Cleveland stadium was "a public building within
the power of a chartered municipality like Cleveland to
construct."1 9
The taxpayer argued that the stadium was being constructed to
benefit the Cleveland baseball team, not the public. The court
addressed this argument by noting that a contract for the use of
the stadium did not exist.20 In refusing to decide explicitly whether
the stadium could be used for the baseball team,2 ' the court
explained that once constructed, the stadium must be used for
lawful purposes.2
The Meyer Court made the proper decision. The citizens of
14. Meyer, 171 N.E.2d at 606. The court stated:
The powers of a municipal corporation are not limited to providing for police,
pavrements, water, light, sewers, docks and markets, but it has been held that a
municipality may minister to the comfort and health of its citizens, and may educate,
instruct, please and amuse its inhabitants; maintain public libraries, parks and
botanical and zoological gardens; provide exhibits for fair or exposition; construct
memorial halls, monuments, statues; conduct public concerts; establish a public golf
course, and construct and maintain any building calculated to promote education,
recreation or pleasure of the public.
Id.
15. Id. at 607. It may seem peculiar to some that the court points with favor to two
ancient empires that eventually failed.
16. Id. These cities include New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and
Baltimore. Id. The court noted that Los Angeles also had a municipal stadium but that it,
too, had to deal with a legal challenge in County of Los Angeles v. Dodge, 197 P. 403 (Cal.
1921). Id.
17. Id at 608. These events include "historical pageants, patriotic celebrations,
playground festivals, all-nations carnivals, civic demonstrations, school pageants, mass
dramas and dramatic and folk festivals, outdoor opera, band concerts, musical festivals,
saengerfests, receptions to famous visitors, mass meetings, community Christmas
celebrations, Americanization ceremonies, expositions and baseball, football, boxing,
wrestling." Id.
18. Id. at 608.
19. Meyer, 171 N.E. 2d at 608.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Cleveland had authorized the public funding. 23 Furthermore, a
stadium is a place where the public gathers for recreation,
24
entertainment, and education.
Nearly two generations later, the issue of using public funds for
stadiums resurfaced in courts across the nation.25 The
overwhelming majority of the courts ruled that public funding of
stadium construction was lawful. 26 However, two courts rejected
27
the use of public funds for stadium construction.
In 1966 in Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled in favor of taxpayers who challenged the use
of public funds to build a spring training campus for the Pittsburgh
Pirates. 28 The City of Deerfield Beach had authorized the issuance
of $1.5 million in bonds for the construction of the training
facility.29 Deerfield Beach planned to lease the facility to Deerstad,
Inc.30 Deerstad, Inc., in turn, would lease the facility to the
Pittsburgh Athletic Company, Inc.3 1 The court ruled that this plan
32
violated two provisions of the Florida Constitution.
First, the Florida Constitution prohibits cities from imposing
taxes for non-municipal purposes.33 The court acknowledged that
an incidental benefit to a private entity does not destroy the public
purpose of a given project.3 4 However, the court reasoned that the
23. Id. at 606.
24. Meyer, 171 N.E.2d at 608.
25. See Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A-2d 894 (Pa. 1966); Conrad v. City of
Pittsburgh, 278 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1966); Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
1966); Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 436 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1968); Bozell v. City of
Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864 (Ohio 1968); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547 (Mass.
1969); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1972).
26. See Annotation, Validity of Governmental Borrowing or Expenditure for Purposes
of Acquiring, Maintaining,or Improving Stadium for Use of ProfessionalAthletic Team, 67
A.L.R. 3d 1186 (1975).
27. See Brandes, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla 1966); see also In Re Opinion of the Justices, 250
N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969).
28. Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 12.
29. Id. at 7. The proposed training facility included a stadium, a dormitory, and dining
facilities. Id. at 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Pittsburgh Athletic Company, Inc. owned the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball
team. Id. The Pirates intended to use Deerfield Beach as its spring training site. Id.
32. Id. at 12. The two provisions violated were sections 5 and 10 of Article IX of the
Florida Constitution. Id. Article IX, section 5 provides that "The Legislature shall
authorize . . . incorporated cities . . . to assess and improve taxes . . . for municipal

purposes, and for no other purposes." Id. at 11. Article IX, section 10 provides that "The
Legislature shall not authorize any . . . city . . . to loan its credit to any corporation,

association, institution or individual."
33. Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 11 (citing FLA CONST. of 1885, art. IX, § 5).
34. Id. at 12.
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proposed spring training campus served a private purpose with an
incidental public benefit.3
In addition, the Florida Constitution prohibits the extension of
public credit to any private entity.36 The court summarily
pronounced that the plan to use public funds for the spring training
37
facility was an invalid extension of Deerfield Beach's credit.
In 1969, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also issued
an opinion advising against the use of public funds to build a
stadium in Boston.3 The court determined that a stadium may be
constructed with public funds if the stadium served a public
39
purpose.
The court placed the burden on the legislature to demonstrate a
public purpose for the stadium. 4° In doing so, the court
acknowledged that the legislature could, in fact, find that
construction of a stadium provided Massachusetts with "economic,
civic and social advantages."4' However, the court warned against
"vague and fragmentary" legislative declarations. 42 The bottom line
was that for-profit private entities were not to be subsidized by the
public.43
The decisions in Brandes and In Opinion of the Justices provide
little, if any, support for present-day claims against public funding
for stadiums. As the dissent in Brandes points out, the majority
ignored a past ruling of the Florida Supreme Court that held that
public funds for improvements to the Orange Bowl Stadium were
valid. 44 Furthermore, the Massachusetts court provided a "road
map" for the legislature to follow in issuing bonds for stadium
construction. 4
35. Id.
36. Id. at 11 (citing FL. CONST. of 1885, art. IX § 10). Deerstad, Inc. was a private
corporation. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 560. In Massachusetts, the House of
Representatives sought an Advisory Opinion on the issue of whether public funds could be
used to construct a multi-use stadium facility. Id. at 558.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 558-59.
41. Id. at 558.
42. Id. at 559.
43. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 558. The court stated:
If the stadium complex and arena under the proposed legislation can be operated, and if
they should in fact be operated, so as in effect to subsidize private organizations operated
for profit, then the facilities could not be said to exist for a public purpose. Id.
44. Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 13 (Thomas, CJ., dissenting) (citing State v. City of Miami,
41 So. 2d 545).
45. Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 559-60.
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At the time of the decisions in Brandes and In re Opinion of the
Justices, other jurisdictions were upholding the public funding of
stadiums.4 In 1966, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued two
opinions upholding the use of public funds for stadium
construction.

47

In Martin v. City of Philadelphia, a taxpayer sought to enjoin
the city from carrying out an ordinance that, subject to voter
approval, permitted the city to loan $25 million toward the
construction of a new stadium. s The taxpayer contended, inter
alia, that the proposed loan violated the state constitution. 49 The
court determined that the lower court was correct when it stated
that "[a] sports stadium is for the recreation of the public and is
hence for a public purpose." 5°
The Martin Court relied on Bernstein v. City of Pittsburgh5 and
Cohen v. Samuel 2 to support its decision to uphold the proposed
extension of public credit.5 In Bernstein, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the use of public funds to construct an
4 The city leased the auditorium to a
auditorium in a public park.M
private, non-profit corporation, which charged admission for the
entertainment that it provided. 55 The court determined that
admission charges at a public park did not destroy the public
purpose of the park.5 6 The court explained that the city did not
pledge its credit to a private organization; it merely leased the
property at a nominal rent.5 7 Therefore, the court held that
construction of the auditorium complied with the Pennsylvania
Constitution.5
In Cohen v. Samuel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced a
taxpayer challenge to the City of Philadelphia's decision to lease a
portion of a public park to a private, for-profit corporation that
46.
47.

Id. at n.7.
Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 218 A.2d

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Martin, 215 A.2d at 894.
Id.
Id. at 896.
Bernstein v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1951).
Cohen v. Samuel, 80 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1951).
Martin, 215 A.2d at 897-98.
Bernstein, 77 A.2d at 452.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 457.
Id.

906.
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intended to build a golf course on the property.59 The court
determined that a public park maintains its public purpose
regardless of whether a private, for-profit, or non-profit°
organization charged admission for recreation, entertainment, etc.6
was entitled to charge
Therefore, the private corporation
61
golf.
of
round
a
for
fees
reasonable
Next up was Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh.62 In Conrad, a
taxpayer sought a ruling to restrain the City of Pittsburgh and the
Stadium Authority of the City of Pittsburgh ("Stadium Authority")

from constructing a new stadium.6 The plan for construction of the
stadium called for the city to loan funds to the Stadium Authority.64
The city then agreed to guarantee the Stadium Authority's $28
65
million debt.
Conrad alleged that the city's deal with the Stadium Authority
violated Article IX, sections 8 and 10, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.6 He argued that, by guaranteeing the Stadium
Authority's debt, the City of Pittsburgh incurred debt that exceeded
constitutional limits. 67 Noting that the city's liability was limited to
its revenues, the court explained that "obligations not exceeding
current revenues do not constitute debts within the contemplation
of the constitution."68
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Bell opined that the city's
59. Cohen, 80 A.2d at 732-33.
60. Id. at 734. The court explained that the distinction between the for-profit and
non-profit corporations has no legal significance on the loaning of public funds. Id.
61. Id.
62. Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh, 218 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1966).
63. Conrad, 218 A2d at 907.
64. Id. at 908. The Public Auditorium Authorities Law authorized the creation of the
Stadium Authority, 53 P.S. § 23841-47. Id.
65. Id. at 908.
66. Id. at 909. Article IX, § 8 stated:
The debt of any county, city, borough, township, school district, or other municipality
or incorporated district . . . shall never exceed seven (7) per centum upon the
assessed value of the taxable property therein, nor shall any such county, municipality
or district inefir any debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding two
(2) per centum upon such assessed valuation of property, without the consent of the
electors thereof at a public election in such manner as shall be provided by law.
Article IX, § 10 stated that "Any county, township, school district or other municipality
incurring any indebtedness shall, at or before the time of so doing, provide for the collection
of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and also the principal thereof within thirty
years." Id.
67. Conrad, 218 A.2d at 909-10. The City of Pittsburgh's taxable property value was
$1,694,897,000. The city's debt was $18,000,000. Thus, the city was able to incur an additional
$15,897,000 in debt. Id. at 909.
68. Id. at 911 (citations omitted).
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agreement to guarantee the Stadium Authority's $28 million
obligation violated both the letter and the spirit of the
constitution.69 Nevertheless, he agreed with the decision based on
70
the court's precedent.
By the mid-1970s, it had become apparent that courts would
uphold plans to use public funds for the construction of stadiums.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Minnesota continued the trend in
71
deciding Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission.
In Lifteau, the owner of a tavern challenged the constitutionality of
the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Act. 72 The act represented a
building block for the use of public bonds to finance construction
of new sports facilities. 73 The bonds, if issued, were to be paid off
from the commission's revenues, admission taxes, and a sin tax on
liquor sales. 74
The highest court of Minnesota took judicial notice of the fact
that sports are an important part of American social life. 75 As a-

result, it ruled that stadium construction served a public purpose. 76
However, this decision conflicted directly with a 1923 decision,
which held that public funds could not be used for a city's
financing of a hockey rink because the rink did not serve a public
purpose.7 7 The Lifteau Court addressed this problem by noting that,
since that 1923 decision, most jurisdictions have found that stadium
construction serves a public purpose. 78 In further support, the court
cited a 1922 case for the proposition that the concept of "public
69. Id. at 913 (Bell, C.J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, 270 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1978).
72. Lifteau, 270 N.W. 2d at 751. The court summarized the Act as follows:
The Act established the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission (Commission)
consisting of seven members. Four of the members, including the chairman, come
from outside the metropolitan area. The primary duties of the Commission are
operation of sports facilities and selection of site, design, and construction of new or
remodeled sports facilities, Minn.St. 473.556. The Act further transferred ownership of
the metropolitan sports area to the Commission. The Commission has taken over
operation of these facilities. As a part of the transfer the Commission assumed the
payment of general obligation and revenue bonds of the city of Minneapolis, originally
issued to finance Metropolitan Stadium. The employees of the metropolitan sports
area commission became Commission employees upon transfer of ownership, Minn.St.
473.564.
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 754.
76. Id. at 753-55.
77. Lifteau, 270 N.W.2d at 753 (discussing Burns v. Essling, 194 N.W. 404 (1923)).
78. Id. at 753.
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purpose" changes over time. 70
After finding the existence of a public purpose, the court
quashed the plaintiffs claim that the plan should fail because its
primary purpose was not to promote economic development but,
rather, to promote entertainment and recreation.8 0 The court
explained that economic development would occur. 8' In response to
other claims made by the plaintiff, the court simply stated that they
amounted to economic and/or political matters, which are for the
legislature, not the courts, to determine.8 2
In the 1980s and 1990s, the cry for publicly funded sports
facilities was again heard across the nation. Lawsuits have arisen
86
85
8
on the issue in Maryland, 83 Wisconsin, Florida, and Washington.
Some new stadiums built with public money have the support of
the citizenry.87 In situations in Which citizens have opposed the use
of public funds to construct new stadiums, many courts have found
a public purpose regardless of the citizens' discontent. 88
In San Francisco, California, several attempts to gain public
89
approval for the construction of a new baseball stadium failed.
79. Id. at 754 (citing Central Lumber Co. v. City of Waseca, 188 N.W. 275 (1922)). In
Central Lumber Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court restated:
Economic and industrial conditions are not stable. Times change. Many municipal
activities, the propriety of which is not now questioned, were at one time thought, and
rightly enough so, of a private character. The constitutional provision that taxes can
be levied only for public purposes remains, but conditions which go to make a
purpose public change.
Id. (quoting Central Lumber Co., 188 N.W. at 275).
80. Id. at 755.
81. Id.
82. Lifteau 270 N.W.2d at 755.
83. See Kelly v. Marylandersfor Sports Sanity, Inc., 530 A.2d 245 (Md. 1987).
84. LibertarianParty of Wisconsin v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996).
85. See Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So.2d 672 (Fl. 1997).
86. See CLEAN (Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now!) v. State,
928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1997); Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 932 P.2d
135 (Wash. 1997); and King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997).
87. See Poe, 695 So.2d at 674. Fifty-three percent of the voters supported the imposition
of a one-half cent sales tax. Id.
88. In 1995 in the State of Washington, King County voters rejected a referendum for a
tax increase for the purpose of funding a new stadium. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1057. In
Pennsylvania, voters in the southwestern part of the commonwealth overwhelmingly rejected
the Regional Renaissance Initiative, which included a one-half percent increase in sales tax
for counties in Southwestern Pennsylvania, with proceeds to be used for new stadiums and
other development projects. Jon Schmitz, Tax Strikes Out. Half-Cent Sales Tax Increase
Loses in All 11 Counties, Closest Margin is in Allegheny, PITrSBURGH PosT-GAzerrE, Nov. 5,
1997, at Al.
89. City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny Regional Destination Financing Plan, p.
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The alternative solution in San Francisco was to use private
funds 0 The local officials who devised the plan in Pittsburgh have
determined that purely private funding was not feasible. 91 The
officials cited Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Seattle, Washington, as
cities that are comparable to Pittsburgh. 92 Wisconsin and
Washington have passed Stadium Acts that authorize public funding
of new stadiums.

I. YER

OUrrA HERE!

In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Southeast Wisconsin Professional
Baseball District ("SEWPBD") was created pursuant to the state's
Stadium Act.93 The SEWPBD is responsible for the construction of
a new baseball stadium.9 4 Funds for the new stadium are made up
of (1) sales and use tax revenues, (2) revenues from the issuance
of revenue bonds, and (3) a contribution by the Milwaukee
Brewers.95 Furthermore, the Brewers will have to pay
96
approximately $1.1 million per year in rent.
In Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin dealt with the issue of whether the Stadium Act
was constitutional.97 The Libertarian Party raised more than a
dozen challenges. 98 Deciding that most of them were without merit,
the court discussed only five.99
The Libertarian Party first argued that the Stadium Act amounted
to a special tax law in violation of Article IV, sections 31 and 32, of
the Wisconsin Constitution. 100 In response, the court determined
that the act created districts through a classification that was
90. Id.
91. City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny Regional Destination Financing Plan.
92. Id.
93. LibertarianParty of Wisconsin v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Wis. 1996).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 429-30.
97. Id. at 428.
98. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d at 430.
99. Id. at 428.
100. Id. Art. IV, § 31, entitled "Special and Private Laws Prohibited," provides, in
pertinent part, that "The legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws
• . . [[flor assessment or collection of taxes or for extending the time for the collection
thereof."
Art. IV § 32, General laws on enumerates subjects, provides that "The legislature may
provide by general law for the treatment of any subject for which lawmaking is prohibited
by section 31 of this article. Subject to reasonable classifications, such laws shall be uniform
in their operation throughout the state." Id.

1999

Constructing Stadiums with Public Funds

"open, germane and relate[d] to true differences between the
entities being classified." 1 1 Therefore, regardless of the fact that
SEWPBD was the only district that fell within the class, the act
constituted general legislation. 10 2
The Libertarian Party argued that a baseball stadium did not
serve a public purpose.10 3 In response, the court noted that the
Brewers may not serve a public purpose, but the baseball park
districts do.0 4 The court determined that an incidental benefit
10 5
enjoyed by the Brewers did not negate the public purpose.
Furthermore, the court explained that the legislature is fit to
determine what constitutes a public purpose. 1 6 The legislature
made this decision when it decided that the baseball districts
served the public purpose of "encouraging economic development
and tourism by reducing unemployment and by bringing needed
capital into the state for the benefit and welfare of people
throughout the state." 0 7 Although the court noted that public
purpose is a concept that changes over time,' °8 they decided that it
was not time to change.
In addition, the Libertarian Party claimed that the Act violated
Article VIII, § 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits the
state from taking part in internal improvements of construction
projects.' °9 The court responded by explaining that the state is well
within the constitutional guidelines in playing a role in the
construction of a building that serves a "predominant government
purpose.""1° Relying on Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves,"' the court
decided that the new stadium served the government interest of
"preserving business activity" in Wisconsin. 1 2 The court also noted
101. Id. at 431.
102. Id. at 431-33.
103. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d. at 433.
104. Id. The court noted that "The question is not whether the game of baseball or the
Milwaukee Brewers serve a public purpose; rather, the question is whether the legislation
creating local baseball park districts satisfies the public purpose doctrine." Id.
105. Id. at 434.
106. Id. at 433-34 (citing State ex. rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 NW. 790 (1969)).
107. Id. at 434.
108. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d. at 433.
109. Id. at 435. Art. VIII § 10, entitled "Internal Improvements," provides that "Except
as further provided in this section, the state may never contract any debt for works of
-internal improvement, or be a party in carrying on such works." Id.
110. Id.
111. State v. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d 1, (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990,
(1966), rehearingdenied, 385 U.S. 1044 (1967).
112. Libertarian Party, 546 N.W.2d at 435 (citing State v. Milwaukee Braves, 144
N.W.2d 1 (1966)).
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The fourth challenge presented was that the municipal debt
exceeded the amount permitted by Article XI, section 3(3), of the
Wisconsin Constitution. 114 On this claim, the court decided that the

new stadium construction did not create public debt." 5 On the
contrary, the Stadium Act created a "special fund" that served to

pay for the stadiums.11 6 This creative financing was deemed to be
constitutional." 7
Finally, the challengers asserted that the state engaged in an
invalid pledge of public credit to benefit a private party."8 The
court rejected this claim." 9 First, it determined that any subsidy
furthered a public purpose.' 20 Next, the court found that the
SEWPBD was not an arm of the state.' 2 ' Moreover, it held that a
provision of the act that authorized the state to pay off the bonds if
the SEWPBD defaulted amounted to an unenforceable moral
obligation.122
II.

THE TAXPAYERS STRIKE OUT

In 1995, voters in Kings County, Washington, went to the polls
and rejected a one-tenth of one percent increase to the state sales
and use tax.'23 Immediately following this defeat, Washington's
governor called the legislature to a special session. 24 The sole
purpose of this session was to consider measures permitting the
use public funds to finance stadium construction.' 25 Within one
113. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d at 436.
114. Id. at 436. Article X §, 3(3) provides:
Any county, city, town, village, school district, sewerage district or other municipal
corporation incurring any indebtedness under sub. (2) shall, before or at the time of
doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest
on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within
20 years from the time of contracting the same.
115. Id. at 436-37.
116. Id. at 436.
117. Id. at 437.
118. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d at 438. Wisc. CONST. art. Viii, § 3, entitled "Credit of
State," provides that "Except as provided in s. 7(2)(a), the credit of the state shall never be
given, or loaned, in aid of any individual, association or corporation." Id.
119. LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d at 438-40.
120. Id. at 438.
121. Id. at 439. The court noted that the Stadium Act provides that "The state is not
liable for the actions of the district." Id.
122. Id. at 440.
123. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1057.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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week, the legislature passed the Stadium Act. 12 6 This act authorized
the use of public funds, through a public facilities district, to be
127
used for construction, maintenance, and other stadium needs.
The efforts of the Washington legislature met with several legal
challenges. Within one year, three cases on the issue of publicly
financed stadiums made their way to the Washington Supreme
Court. 12 In court, the opponents of publicly funded stadiums struck
1

out. 29

In CLEAN v. Washington, Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and
Accountability Now ("CLEAN") alleged that the Stadium Act
violated five state constitutional provisions.' 3° First, CLEAN argued
that the act violates a provision of the Washington Constitution
providing that taxes "shall be levied and collected for public
purposes only."13' The court responded to this argument by noting
that public purposes are determined by the legislature and that
most other jurisdictions have held that stadium construction serves
a public purpose. 32 The court further explained that the substantial
benefits that the Seattle Mariners may realize are merely incidental
to the public purpose being served. 13 Then, in a most peculiar
statement considering the public's sentiment against the use of
public funds for the stadium, the court noted that public purpose
"is a concept that must necessarily evolve and change to meet
changing public attitudes."lM
Next, CLEAN contended that the Stadium Act violated
constitutional provisions prohibiting the extension of public credit
to private entities. 3 5 In determining whether there was a
126. Id. at 1057-58. The special session convened on October 11, 1995 and concluded
by enacting legislation on October 17, 1995. Id.
127. Id. at 1058.
128. See cases cited supra note 86.
129. Id.
130. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1056.
131. Id. See WASH. CONST. art VII, § 1, which provides for taxation for public purposes
only. Id.
132. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1060-61.
133. Id. at 1061.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1061. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7. Section 5 provides that "The
credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual,
association, company or corporation."
Section 7 provides as follows:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money,
or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association,
company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or
become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association,
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constitutional violation the court applied the following two-prong
test: (1) are the public funds targeted for a basic government
service; if so, then (2) was consideration given in return for the
13 6
funding?
The court conceded that construction of a stadium is not a
"fundamental purpose" of a government. 13 However, the court
found that adequate
consideration-the
lease with the
Mariners-was given in return for the public funds. 1'8 Therefore,
the court held that the Stadium Act did not amount to an
139
unconstitutional extension of public credit.
The third constitutional challenge was that the use of public
funds to build a stadium was tantamount to an investment by
government in a private organization. 140 The stadium financing plan
does call for the Mariners and King County to share profits, but
only for the term of the bonds.' 4' The court pointed out that the
142
profit sharing is merely a means of security for the public debt.
Furthermore, CLEAN asserted that the Stadium Act was special
legislation, which is prohibited by the state constitution.143 The
court disagreed, finding that the Stadium Act constitutes general
legislation because it applies to a class.'4 A class, the court
concluded, can be composed of a single person or entity.'4
company or corporation.
Id.
136. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1061. First, the court asks if the funds are being expended to
carry out a fundamental purpose of the government? If the answer to that question is yes,
then no gift of public funds has been made. The second prong comes into play only when
the expenditures are held to not serve fundamental purposes of government. The court then
focuses on the consideration received by the public for the expenditure of public funds and
the donative intent of the appropriating body in order to determine whether or not a gift has
occurred (citations omitted). Id.
137. Id. at 1062. The court stated, "It cannot be seriously contended that the
development of a baseball stadium for a major league team is a 'fundamental purpose' of
state government." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1063. See WASH. CoNSr. art. VIII, § 7. Id.
141. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1063. The court noted that after the bonds are paid off, the
District will not have any ownership rights in the Seattle Mariners. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. See WASH. CONST., art. II, § 28. The court explained the difference between
special and general legislation as follows: "Special legislation which operates upon a single
person or entity. General legislation, on the other hand, operates upon all things or people
within a class. A class, however, may consist of one person or corporation as long as the
law applied to all members of the class." Id. at 1063 (citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Finally, CLEAN contended that the Stadium Act usurped the
citizens' constitutional right to have a voter referendum to reject or
approve the act.'4 The constitution provides for the availability of a
referendum to "approve or reject" legislative acts unless the act is
"necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety, (sic) support of the state government and its
existing public institutions. " 147 The Stadium Act contained a clause
that parroted the emergency clause of the referendum provision of
the state constitution.14 Because it contained an emergency clause,
the court ruled that the act did not violate the referendum
provision of the constitution. 49 Strike one!
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders expressed his displeasure
with the majority's ruling concerning the referendum provision. 15°
The essence of his opinion is that the legislature failed to explain
the emergency.'5 ' He further expressed his belief that there was no
emergency and the phrase was inserted merely to block the
referendum.152
After deciding CLEAN, the Supreme Court of Washington3
decided Citizens For More Important Things v. King County,"
which again raised the invalid public purpose argument.T M Citizens
For More Important Things claimed that using public funds for
stadium preconstruction costs without first receiving a commitment
146. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1064. WASH. CoNST. art. II, § 1, provides:
Legislative powers, where vested. The legislative authority of the state of Washington
shall be vested in the legislature, ... but the people reserve to themselves the power
to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislature, and also reserve power, at their own option to approve or reject at the
polls any act, item, section, or part of any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature...
. (b) Referendum. The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it
may be ordered on any act, bill, law or any part thereof passed by the legislature,
except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government and its existing public
institution.
147. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1064 (citing WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (Amend. 72)).
148. See WASH. REv. CODE § 82.14.0485, Historical Note 1995 3rd Sp.S. C1 § 310
(October 17, 1995).
149. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1068-69. One would have a difficult time supporting an
argument that a new stadium is "necessary for the immediate presentation of the public
peace, health or safety [or] support of the state government and its existing public
institutions."
150. CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1073 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1074-75 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1075 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
153. 932 P.2d 135.
154. Citizens for More Important Things, 932 P.2d at 135.
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from the Mariners did not serve a public purpose. 155 The court
relied on CLEAN's finding of a public purpose for the Stadium Act
and held that the preconstruction cost provision of the act was also
constitutional. 156 Strike two!
The third case to reach the Supreme Court of Washington was
King County v. Taxpayers of King County.157 Among the issues the
court addressed were (1) whether the bond issuance was lawful,
(2) whether the lease agreement amounted to an unconstitutional
gift of public money to a private corporation, and (3) whether
taxes imposed to pay off bonds were constitutional. l 5
In upholding the validity of the bond issuance to finance the
stadium, the court adopted the following three-part test:' 19
(1) Is there legislative or constitutional authority delegated to
the municipality to issue the bonds for the particular purpose?
(2) Was the statute authorizing the bond issue constitutionally
enacted? If not constitutionally enacted or if unconstitutional
for any other reason, the issue is void and recitals are of no
effect. (3) Is the purpose for which the bonds are issued, a
public and corporate purpose, as distinguished from a private
purpose?' 60
The court explained that the stadium served a public purpose that
incidentally benefited a private organization.' 6'
On the issue of whether the lease constituted an unconstitutional
gift of public funds, the court reiterated its holding in CLEAN: a
lease agreement charging nominal rent might violate the state
constitution. 62 The court then determined that the lease was
supported by sufficient consideration. 16 Furthermore, the court
noted that, although the deal may be bad, the court's job is to rule
on the deal's constitutionality, not its wisdom.
155. Id. No major league team had committed to playing in a new stadium if built. Id.
156. Id. at 137.
157. 949 P.2d 1260.
158. King County, 949 P.2d at 1263. There were five issues decided by the court.
However, only three of them are relevant to this comment.
159. Id. at 1265.
160. Id. (quoting 15 EUGENE McQUnL, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.04 at 575 (3d ed.
1995)).
161. Id. at 1266.
162. Id. at 1266.
163. King County, 949 P.2d at 1266. The court quoted from CLEAN, "Enter into an
agreement with the Mariners that would permit the ball club to play its games in the stadium
for only nominal rent, then the constitutional prohibitions against maling a gift of state
funds might be implicated." Id. (citation omitted).
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The court then held that the new taxes authorized by the
Stadium Act and imposed on King County residents were
unconstitutional.1 64 In making this determination, the court
reiterated that stadium construction serves a public purpose
because it enhances the economy and the quality of life for the
citizens of Washington. 16 Strike three! The taxpayers are out.
Justice Sanders again dissented. He reaffirmed his belief that the
1 66
supreme court had blatantly disregarded the state constitution.
Judge Sanders was of the view that the judiciary conspired with
the legislative and executive branches of government to put an end
to all taxpayer claims against public funding of a new stadium. 167 In
his opinion, the public funds earmarked to finance the new stadium
constituted a public gift to a private organization and, therefore,
violated the state constitution.168
Justice Sanders also explained that the court should act as a
watchdog for the will of the people, which is expressed in the state
constitution. 169 He then noted that the court had failed in its duty to
protect the citizens from the shortcomings of their elected

leaders. 170
The trio of cases in Washington clearly expresses one idea-that
the courts will uphold public funding of sports stadiums regardless
of public opinion. The question that remains is whether the
Washington court ignored the coistitutional ground rules. On the
referendum issue, the answer is yes. It is preposterous to think that
stadium construction constitutes a state emergency. However, on
the issue of whether the stadium serves a public purpose, the
answer is no. Members of the public attend baseball games as a
leisure activity.
Im.

WILL THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS ENFORCE THE GROUND RuLEs?

When a Pennsylvania citizen files suit to enjoin the use of public
funds for the construction of two new stadiums, the following
provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution will serve as the
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1291 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting). Regarding the bond issuance, Justice Sanders stated
that the issuance was "invalid absent an affirmative vote in that election. But there will be
no election because the county unlawfully prevented it, and this court will not defend the
legal rights of the citizens to hold one." Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting).
168. King County, 949 P.2d at 1291 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting).
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ground rules: Article VIII, section 7;171 Article VIII, section 8;172
Article IX, section 9;173 and Article IX, section 10.'74 If the court
interprets these ground rules consistently with past decisions
involving the use of public funds, then the proposal will be
upheld.'

75

On February 9, 1999, Pennsylvania enacted legislation enabling
the use of commonwealth funds for the construction of sports
facilities.' 76 Under Article VIII, section 7, the commonwealth may
incur debt for capital projects so long as the debt is paid within the
period of useful life of the project and the commonwealth remains
171. PA- CONST. art. VIII, § 7(b) provides:
All debt incurred for capital projects shall mature within a period not to exceed the
estimated useful life of the projects as stated in the authorizing law, and when so
stated shall be conclusive. All debt, except indebtedness permitted by clause(2)(i),
shall be amortized in substantial and regular amounts, the first of which shall be due
prior to the expiration of a period equal to one-tenth the term of the debt.
172. PA. CONST. art. Viii, § 8 provides that "The credit of the Commonwealth shall not
be pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or. association nor shall the
Commonwealth become a joint owner or stockholder in any company, corporation or
association."
173. PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 9 provides:
The General Assembly shall not authorize any municipality or incorporated district to
become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation, or to obtain or
appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, association, institution
or individual. The General Assembly may provide standards by which municipalities or
school district may give financial assistance or lease property to leasing is necessary
to the health, safety or welfare of the Commonwealth or any municipality or school
district. Existing authority of any municipality or incorporated district to obtain or
appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution
or individual, is preserved.
174.

PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 10 provides:

Subject only to the restrictions imposed by this section, the General Assembly shall
prescribe the debt limits of all units of local government including municipalities and
school districts. For such purposes, the debt limit base shall be a percentage of the
total revenue, as defined by the General Assembly, of the unit of local government
computed over a specific period immediately preceding the year of borrowing. The
debt limit to be prescribed in every such case shall exclude all indebtedness (1) for
any project to the extent that it is self-liquidating or self-supporting or which has
heretofore been defined as self-liquidating or self-supporting, or (2) which has been
approved by referendum held in such manner as shall be provided by law. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the city or County of Philadelphia.
Any unit of local government, including municipalities and school districts, incurring
any indebtedness, shall at or before the time of so doing adopt a covenant, which
shall be binding upon it so long as any such indebtedness shall remain unpaid, to
make payments out of its sinking fund or any other of its revenues or funds at such
time and in such annual amounts specified in such covenant as shall be sufficient for
the payment ofthe interest thereon and the principal thereof when due.
175. See Bernstein, 77 A.2d 452; Cohen, 80 A.2d 732; Martin, 215 A.2d at 894; and
Conrad, 218 A.2d at 906.
176. 1999 Pa S.B. 10.
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under its debt ceiling.'77 The law requires that the professional
sports team benefiting from the stadium perform at the stadium for
the longer of the term of its lease or the expiration of the
commonwealth's debt,7 8 limited to the estimated useful life of 29.5
years. Therefore, so long as the commonwealth does not exceed its
debt ceiling, the amount loaned to the PAA is a valid use of the
commonwealth's money.179
Under Article VIII, section 8, the commonwealth is prohibited
from pledging public credit to private organizations.180 In explaining
the meaning of the phrase "pledge or loan of credit," the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it was a term of art that
"was not intended to prohibit . . . financial transactions between
the Commonwealth and private... corporations that serve a public
purpose and are otherwise lawful." 181 Furthermore, the same court
determined that a loan to a public authority for construction of a
facility with a subsequent lease to a private entity does not violate
Article VIII, section 8.182
Under the current stadium funding proposal, the PAA will own
the stadiums' 83 and will, in turn, lease them to the respective
teams.'4 This is the identical situation that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held to be valid in Basehore v. Hampden Industrial
85
Development Authority.
Article IX, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled
"Appropriation for Public Purpose," prohibits the legislature from
authorizing a municipality to "loan its credit to any corporation,
association, institution or individual ... [unless it is] necessary to
the health, safety or welfare of the Commonwealth or any
municipality." 86 Under this provision, public funds may be used for
a project that constitutes a public purpose. 187 Most courts deciding
the issue have held that stadiums serve a public purpose. 188
177.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
1968).
183.
Proposal,
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.

1999 Pa S.B. 10, § 504(1).
See generally Basehore, 248 A-2d 212.
See supra note 174.
Totso v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (Pa. 1975).
Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Development Authority, 248 A.2d 212, 222 (Pa
City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny Regional Destination Financing Plan
April, 21, 1998, p.6.
Id.
Basehore, 248 A.2d at 222.
PA. CONST. art. IX § 9.
Id.
See 67 A.LR.3d 1186 (collecting cases).
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Pennsylvania is no different.'8 9
To establish a valid public purpose, local government officials
will direct attention to anticipated economic development,
entertainment,
and
recreation.
Regarding
the
economic
development to derive from the existence of new stadiums, courts
will generally defer to legislative judgments concerning potential
economic benefits.' 90 Furthermore, Pennsylvania case law supports
the entertainment and recreation claims. 191 However, it has been
noted that public purpose is a concept that necessarily changes
92
with time.'
Under Article IX, section 10, it is permissible to use public funds
to finance a project if the debt is self-liquidating. 193 However, in the
current stadium financing proposal, the bonds are to be backed by
the Regional Asset District, not by revenues from the stadium. 94
Therefore, the debt is not self-liquidating and must comply with the
95
state-authorized debt limitations.
Opponents of the use of public funds for stadium financing face
an unenviable situation (similar to being five runs down in the
bottom of the ninth inning with two outs and nobody on base). To
block the proposed stadium funding, they will have to convince the
court that sports stadiums no longer constitute a public purpose. In
doing so, they must establish that stadiums do not spark economic
development, that entertainment is not a public purpose, and that
watching sports is not recreation. If the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court accepts this argument, it will stand alone among the nation's
state courts.
Supporters, on the other hand, can take comfort in Pennsylvania
precedent and decisions from other jurisdictions. Their arguments
will closely resemble Justice Musmanno's concurring opinion in
Conrad, where, in an emotional outpouring, Justice Musmanno
pointed out that a city is responsible for a "municipal spirit"
beyond the bare necessities of its population. 96 "Baseball," he
wrote, "[is] an indispensably integral part of our municipal
189. See Conrad, 218 A-2d 906 and Martin, 215 A-2d 894.
190. See LibertarianParty, 546 N.W.2d 424. See also Regional District Financing Plan.
191. Bernstein, 77 A-2d at 455.
192. Conrad, 218 A.2d at 913 (Musmanno, J., concurring). For the proposition, Justice
Musmanno cited Evans v. W. Norriton Township Municipal Authority, 87 A.2d 474.
193. See PA. CONST. art. IX § 10.
194. City of Pittsburgh and County of Allegheny Regional Destination Financing Plan
(July 1, 1998).
195. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
196. Conrad, 218 K2d at 914 (Musmanno, J., concurring).
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American way of life." 19 7 Justice Musmanno concluded by
explaining that once the stadium is built, the challengers of the
project will be happy they lost. 198
The opponents this time around can point to the Conrad case
and essentially say "We told you so." The likely response will be:
The plan is constitutional. Your recourse is at the ballot box. Until
we meet again in the year 2030, let's play ball!
Michael J. Cremonese

197. Id. at 915 (Musmanno, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 916 (Musmanno, J., concurring).

